asymptomatic patients died or had ventricular fibrillation. The strongest predictor of adverse outcome was a positive invasive electrophysiology study during which malignant ventricular arrhythmias were induced. Inducible individuals had a six-fold increased risk of sudden death or ventricular fibrillation during the subsequent 2 years compared with non-inducible subjects.
The second research group led by Priori et al in Italy reported the natural history of 200 patients with Brugada syndrome. 10 Inducibility at electrophysiology study was not predictive of untoward clinical outcomes in their cohort. The highest risk feature was an ECG consistent with the diagnosis at baseline and a history of syncope; 44% of these patients had a cardiac arrest. Their group advocated placement of an implantable cardioverterdefibrillator in such patients and no treatment in asymptomatic patients whose baseline ECG was normal.
Eckardt and colleagues describe a large cohort with Brugada syndrome (212 patients) from four European centres with the longest follow-up yet published (40 [SD 50] months). Only 1% of the initially asymptomatic patients had an arrhythmic episode during follow-up. Their cohort seemed to be at lower risk for sudden death than the Brugada registry, perhaps because of a selection bias in the latter group. Importantly, Eckardt did not find that electrophysiology study was useful for risk stratification. Indeed, such testing was negative in four of nine Brugada syndrome patients who eventually had clinical events. Their sentinel work is highly useful because they show that asymptomatic patients with incidentally discovered ECGs consistent with Brugada syndrome are at relatively low-risk for cardiac events.
The Second Consensus Conference on Brugada syndrome recently recommended placement of an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator for cardiac-arrest survivors but admitted that it is unclear if asymptomatic patients should receive treatment. 11 Eckardt and colleagues' study suggests that such patients will do well and do not require intervention. Additionally, they did not find that invasive electrophysiology study was a useful tool for risk-stratification and should not be used.
All groups sound a word of caution with their findings due to the short follow-up in their studies. Whether initially asymptomatic patients could have a cardiac arrest decades after their diagnosis is unknown. Such findings will only be revealed over time. Affected family members who have not yet had symptoms must wait as we all continue to learn more about the natural history of Brugada syndrome.
*Kathryn A Glatter, Nipavan Chiamvimonvat, Matti Viitasalo, Qing Wang, Dipika Tuteja

Microbial challenge studies-a challenge worth accepting
The Academy of Medical Sciences recently released a report on microbial challenge studies in volunteers. 1 The report is intended as a guidance document for anyone concerned with the appropriateness and conduct of such studies. The main theme of the report is ethical, balancing the rights of volunteers with the needs of the community, and the possible benefits arising from understanding the mechanisms of microbial disease, and how to fight it. The case for undertaking these types of studies is overwhelming, but so are the requirements to get the studies and their aftermath right.
A look at the panel will explain what I mean. Between 1946 and 1989, the Medical Research Council's Common Cold Unit (near Salisbury in Wiltshire, UK) did 1006 studies, mostly on 19 911 male and female volunteers (with several thousands volunteering for experiments many times). 2, 3 Thanks to the efforts of the staff and volunteers we know that the cold is a syndrome caused by very many different agents and we have what I call "Tyrrell's rule of three". In any given year, a third of upper respiratory infections will have no known cause. A third will be caused by a mixture of agents: this third consists of all known agents, with the exception of rhinoviridae, which cause the remaining third.
The understanding of the mechanisms of causality and transmission led to a move away from advocating vaccines for respiratory syndromes, and a renewed interest in any interventions that might enhance general immunity and interrupt transmission. These lessons were partly relearned during the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome but their day-to-day application still escapes humanity.
So, does the report give good guidance on how to gain knowledge and minimise the risk to volunteers intentionally exposed to microbes? Partly, I think. The sections on recruitment and safety of volunteers, the surrounding community, and researchers seem the strongest and most detailed. The recommendations for the creation of a National Expert Advisory Committee to oversee all challenge studies and the institution of a national register are sensible. Researchers will also be grateful for other pointers, such as those about adequate insurance cover. Other crucial parts are, in my view, vague and miss a golden opportunity for moving our knowledge and safeguards further.
The report quotes the Declaration of Helsinki in the development of the rationale for the challenge study: "Medical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scientific principles and should be based on adequately performed laboratory and animal experimentation and on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature." What is meant by "thorough knowledge" is not specified. The text should contain a specific requirement for quoting or undertaking a systematic review of available human and animal evidence on the topic as an absolute requirement for ethical clearance and funding. This requirement should minimise the risk of the knowledge sought not being already available, and thus volunteers being exposed unnecessarily to microbes when the answer to the study question is already known.
Different study designs are not discussed in the report. Should only comparative designs, such as controlled trials and cohort studies, be included or are non-comparative cohorts acceptable too? This is another ethical conundrum, because controlled trials are the most informative, but cohorts might be needed and the only feasible design in an emergency such as a pandemic.
Next comes the issue of documentation and our responsibilities to future generations. The national register of studies should be expanded to include a confidential depository of all records to do with all challenge studies. Why? Because we do not know what requirements there will be in the future. Historical cohorts of volunteers exposed to microbes and their unexposed controls with their records, tissues (a well-detailed part of the report), and possible follow-up could help answer future questions. Because there are several past and present challenge studies (listed in the report), we should also try our best to obtain as much evidence as possible from these studies and link up internationally similar registers. The idea is to squeeze every drop of evidence from existing animal and human studies.
What about the role of the pharmaceutical industry in challenge studies? It is odd that no mention is made of their role, as the review group was chaired by an industry physician and, in the Common Cold Unit's days, industry provided most of the experimental antiviral compounds for testing, while contributing to vaccine production and testing. The report is good and its publication timely, but its content is too general and in parts is outdated.
Challenge studies are difficult but vital, let us not lose this opportunity for advancing our understanding, and making sure no-one is exposed to microbes unnecessarily.
Tom Jefferson
Cochrane Vaccines Field, 00061 Anguillara Sabazia, Rome, Italy Toj1@aol.com I dedicate this Comment to the memory of Dr David Tyrrell. I declare that I make an income from doing systematic reviews. The current epidemic of the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian influenza, with a mortality of 58%, appears relentless in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Thailand. 1 Although inefficient, there is some evidence of human-to-human transmission for the H5N1 virus. 2 A possible catastrophic pandemic could, therefore, emerge should re-assortment of viral antigens occur resulting in a highly infectious strain of H5N1. Influenza pandemics in 1917-18, 1957-58, and 1968-69 have already caused approximately 15, 4, and 0·75 million deaths worldwide, respectively. A vaccine for H5N1 will not be available in the foreseeable months. Even if pharmaceutical manufacturing begins soon after an outbreak, there would not be a sufficient supply for the countries most in need-ie, the Asian nations. Antiviral drugs are consequently the only specific treatment, pending availability of effective vaccines. These include M2 inhibitors (amantadine and rimantadine), which are ineffective against H5N1 in vitro, and the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). 3 The neuraminidase inhibitors reduce the severity and duration of symptoms, and prevent clinical influenza as post-exposure and seasonal prophylaxis. 4 Influenza contingency plans by the WHO and most governments generally advocate detection, isolation, staff protection, and the start of antiviral treatment for patients, and their contacts. 5 Many governments, including those of Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Korea, have already stockpiled, at a very substantial expense, vast quantities of oseltamivir to prepare for an outbreak. 5 Nonetheless, the efficacy of neuraminidase inhibitors, even for non-H5N1 influenza A in healthy people and taken within 48 h of disease onset, is only slight (table). [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] The use of oseltamivir in five of the ten cases reported in Vietnam did not show any obvious clinical efficacy, and the mortality was 80% in this cohort. 12 The two neuraminidase inhibitors, oseltamivir and zanamivir, have not been directly compared in controlled trials. Their pharmacological properties are compared in the table. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] Although both have similar efficacy, zanamivir has fewer adverse reactions, and a favourable resistance profile. The resistance factor would be an important consideration in a pandemic situation. The reasons for zanamivir not being chosen for stockpiling might include concern that young children and patients with intellectual or coordination impairments would not be able to inhale zanamivir properly, although there are novel ways of giving the drug to children. 13 The occurrence of bronchospasm and reduced lung function is very rare, and patients with asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) seem to tolerate inhalation of zanamivir as well as the placebo. 14 The inhaled flow rate needed to give the custom-designed inhaler for zanamivir (49-110 L/min)
H5N1 influenza pandemic: contingency plans
Zanamivir Oseltamivir
Age approved for prophylaxis 6, 7 Ͼ5 years Ͼ13 years
Age approved for treatment 6, 7 Ͼ5 years Ͼ1 year Renal impairment 6, 7 No dose adjustment required Adjustment if creatinine clearance 10-30 mL/min Hepatic impairment 6, 7 No dose adjustment required Safety not established Reduction of influenza symptoms 8, 9 By median of 1·5 day By median of 1·3 day Adverse reactions 6, 7 Allergy-very rare Nausea 7·0-10·7% Bronchospasm and Vomiting 2·1-8·0% dyspnoea-very rare Diarrhoea 3·2-5·5% Rash and urticaria-very rare Bronchitis 0·7-3·7% Headache 1·6-20·1% Fatigue 0·8-7·9% Frequency of drug resistance None reported 1·3 and 8·6-18·0% in adults and after treatment 10, 11 children, respectively 
